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DISPOSITION OF APPEAL 
This Court heard oral arguments on the appeal of this 
case on May 9, 1989 and under date of May 10, 1989 issued notice 
that the Court elected to dispose of the case under Rule 30(d) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The judgment appealed 
was affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 
Defendants\Appellants seek rehearing of this appeal on 
the grounds that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended the 
law or facts set forth in the following points: 
POINT ONE. DISPOSITION OF THIS APPEAL IS NOT 
APPROPRIATE WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION. 
Following oral arguments on this case, the Court elected 
to affirm the lower court's judgment and to dispose of the case 
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under Rule 30(d) R. Utah S.Ct. This Rule seems to permit the 
Court to dispose of a case without written opinion if the Court 
concludes that the criteria set forth in Rule 31(b) are 
satisfied. 
Rule 31 in its entirety appears to apply only to 
voluntary motions for expedited appeals, consented to by all 
parties, where there are uncomplicated factual and legal issues 
and the substantive rules of law are deemed settled. If Rule 
30(d) permits the Court on its own motion to render a decision 
without written opinion and without the Rule 31 required consent 
of the parties, then this Rule appears to directly contradict 
Rule 30(c). 
Rule 30(c) does not appear to be discretionary, but 
instead provides that when a judgment, decree or order is 
reversed, modified, or affirmed by the Court, the reasons 
therefor shall be stated concisely in writing, and filed with 
the clerk. This Rule is the embodiment of former Article VIII, 
Section 25, of the Constitution of Utah, and Rule 76 U.R.C.P, 
both of which contained no exception to the requirement for a 
written opinion (Article VIII, repealed and reenacted without 
Section 25, effective July 25, 1985; Rule 76 repealed, effective 
January 1, 1985). 
If the repeal of these provisions and the adoption by 
this Court of Rule 30(d) was intended to give this Court 
discretion to determine when a written opinion should be 
rendered, then the Court should exercise it cautiously and be 
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particularly mindful of the compelling reasons for the prior 
constitutional mandate. 
Such reasons included the opportunity to instruct the 
parties to the appeal of the rationale and reasoning for the 
Court's decision and to confer the benefit of such instruction 
on the public and practicing bar by the publication of such 
opinion. Certainly, of no less importance, requiring a written 
opinion with the reasons stated protects the integrity of the 
judicial process by tending to dispel any appearance of 
impropriety in rendering a decision, e.g. by undue influence, 
bias, or prejudice towards a lawyer or a law firm. 
Clearly, with respect to the parties to the appeal, the 
failure to set forth concise reasons for the disposition, makes 
it very difficult to sensibly present a petition for rehearing 
under Rule 35. Rule 35, requires that the petition state with 
particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner 
claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended. Without an 
opinion, the parties are left to best guess or speculation, 
since the Court has not shared its reasoning process. 
This writer is not unmindful that it is the duty of the 
attorney representing his client to properly formulate and 
present the issues to the Court so that a full and proper 
decision can be rendered. In this respect, Defendants' counsel 
readily admits that he apparently failed. Such failure may have 
occurred because counsel relied too heavily upon the record, 
including Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim and Memorandum of 
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Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (dated October 9, 1986), which more expansively briefed 
the legal issues and their application to the facts. 
In any event, this appeal meets the criteria of Rule 
31(c) which requires a written opinion in cases raising, inter 
alia, substantive constitutional issues, issues of significant 
public interest, or issues of law of first impression. 
The substantive constitutional issue is under the 
Homestead provision, Article XXII, Section 1, of the Utah 
Constitution. This provision requires the legislature to 
provide by law for the selection of a homestead which may 
consist of one or more parcels of land. The legislature has 
implemented the provision by enacting Section 78-23-3 U.C.A., 
which provides in pertinent part under subsection (2) that "a 
homestead shall be exempt from judicial lien..." and in Section 
78-23-4 U.C.A. provides a method for an individual to select and 
claim a homestead by filing a declaration at any time prior to 
an execution sale of the homestead interest. If prior to the 
attachment of a judgment lien, the homestead interest is 
conveyed by the owner/claimant (in this case from Debra to her 
husband Edwin) —does a selection of a homestead have to be made 
and a declaration filed then to perfect the claim; and if not, 
when is the latest time such selection and filing must be made 
to protect the interest so conveyed? 
If as this Court has previously held, Sanders v. 
Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah, 1978), the homestead is created and 
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exists from the time of taking title without a selection having 
been made or a declaration filed; then was Plaintiff entitled to 
assert a claim and cloud the title then held by Debra's husband, 
Edwin Compton, even though no homestead declaration had been 
filed? If Plaintiff was so entitled, then was Debra required to 
file a Declaration of Homestead, not then being a title owner of 
the property, in order to protect the exempt portion she had 
previously conveyed to her husband from Plaintiff's attack as a 
fraudulent conveyance? In any event, since she did then file 
the Declaration, should either of the Comptons have been 
compelled to involuntarily surrender the funds resulting from 
the sale of both Edwin's original interest and the exempt 
interest in the home, when Section 78-23-3(5) U.C.A., exempts 
such sale proceeds? 
The more interesting issue involved here is whether or 
not Edwin Compton and/or Debra Compton should be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees under Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. 
There has not been a Utah case interpreting this statute since 
enactment in 1981, so it surely can be said to be one of first 
impression. If either Edwin Compton or Debra Compton was 
entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent Plaintiff from 
taking the proceeds from the sale of the home, then it seems 
Plaintiff didn't record a Lis Pendens, it recorded a "Notice 
of Lien..." stating that Plaintiff's lien should be entered 
against Debra Compton's interest in Lot 12, Holbrook Heights 
(the family home). See copy appended as exhibit to Stipulated 
Facts in Appellants' Brief. 
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unreasonable to deprive them of an award of attorney's fees for 
choosing a more expedient and less expensive way of solving the 
urgent problem and one involving less risk of losing the pending 
sale transaction or harming the innocent purchaser in 
possession. It is uncertain here if the Court reached this 
important issue of first impression or not. 
The Court's interpretation of Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. 
will necessarily involve other issues in this case of 
significant public interest. A homestead claimant, like Debra 
Compton, is often faced with the practical problem of needing to 
sell the family home, but being unable to because the home is 
encumbered by judgment liens in excess of the value of the 
property. What procedure or method is available to the 
homestead claimant to achieve a marketable title for the 
purposes of a sale? Section 78-23-3 U.C.A.: (2) makes the 
homestead exempt from judicial lien; (5) provides that when a 
homestead is conveyed by the owner, the conveyance cannot 
subject the property to a lien which it would not be subject to 
in the hands of the owner and upon sale of the exempt interest, 
the resulting proceeds are exempt for at least a period of a 
year; and, (7) permits the claimant to reinvest in another 
homestead. 
The practical difficulty is whether or not the holder of 
a judicial lien has any duty to remove the lien, when the 
claimant desires to sell and convey, in order to comply with the 
statute which says that the homestead interest is exempt from 
7 
judicial lien. No reasonable solution was available in 1978 
when the decision in Sanders v. Cassitv was rendered. The third 
party purchaser, upon discovering that a judgment lien had 
attached prior to the homestead claimant's conveyance to him, 
was required to bring an action seeking declaratory relief that 
the lien was not valid or enforceable as a result of the 
Homestead Exemption. The attendant expense must have been 
considerable. 
Since Sanders was decided, the Utah Legislature in 1981 
enacted Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. which provides a remedy by 
entitling the homestead claimant or the claimant's spouse, or 
even a dependent to injunctive relief, damages or both to 
prevent or redress a violation of the chapter and permits an 
award of the costs and attorneyfs fees as well. It seems that 
the key word "prevent" and the entitlement to injunctive relief 
would seem to suggest that the legislature recognized the 
difficulty of bearing enormous expense in order to protect an 
exemption amount that in most circumstances is less than the 
maximum allowed of $11,000.00 for a family of four ($8000.00 
head of household, $2000.00 spouse, $500.00 for each dependent). 
The remedial purpose will be frustrated if this Court does not 
adopt a liberal view of an award of expenses. 
In this case, of course, the amount in controversy, 
representing the exempted homestead interest that had been 
transferred by Debra Compton to her husband, was no more than 
$700.00 or $800.00. Nonetheless, there is a significant public 
8 
interest which should not be based upon or determined by the 
amount in controversy, which undoubtedly is going to be small in 
every case involving a Homestead Exemption. 
Since this case should be viewed by the Court as 
involving a significant public interest and certainly the first 
interpretation of a remedial statute, the Court should render a 
written decision and rehear and correct any misapprehensions in 
the law so that the interests of justice will be properly 
served. 
POINT TWO. THE PAYMENT OF SALE PROCEEDS TO PLAINTIFF 
WAS UNDER DURESS AND WA8 NOT AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, 
The Court may have misapprehended the legal significance 
of Defendants' having first recorded the Homestead Declaration 
and then instructing the title company to record the warranty 
deed to the purchaser and to release the sale proceeds to 
Plaintiff Freed Leasing. 
Defendants did not do so to settle their claim or 
otherwise create an accord and satisfaction and certainly did 
not do so voluntarily to relinquish their claim. They did so 
only to prevent greater loss under circumstances where a secured 
lender agreed to significantly discount its loan payoff to 
facilitate the sale provided the sale was closed immediately. 
This was briefed before the trial judge, who properly concluded 
that there was no accord and satisfaction since the payment was 
made under duress. 
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It is a general rule of common law that a person could 
not recover back money he voluntarily paid with full knowledge 
of all of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion or 
menace of some form (See 66 Am Jr 2d, Restitution, Section 93). 
In contrast, it also firmly established that where money or 
proceeds are obtained by coercion or duress, the funds may be 
recovered in an action for monies had and received because the 
payment would be deemed involuntary and the law would compel 
restitution (Id., Section 97). 
The strict rule of common law, required that an act was 
not done under coercion or duress if there was another remedy 
immediately available that would provide relief to the party 
(Id., Section 114). Thus, where the person has the time and 
opportunity to relieve themselves from the predicament by 
resorting to ordinary legal methods; but nevertheless pays the 
money, the payment will be deemed voluntary and he cannot 
recover it (Id., Section 114). 
However, where the claim relates to the title, seizure 
or detention of property, the rule has been substantially 
relaxed, so that the payment is deemed involuntary if 
circumstances create some hardship or serious inconvenience to 
the owner of the property regardless of the availability of less 
expedient and practical remedies (Id.. Section 101). A simple 
example would be the choice a car owner may be faced with when 
the auto repairman claims that the bill for $1,000.00 is proper 
but the owner reminds the repairman that the quote was only 
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$200.00. It is easy to see that the owner should not be 
required to go to court and obtain an injunction in order to 
recover the use of his car. He may simply pay the money and 
turn around and sue to recover it as improperly exacted. 
The foregoing rules, of course, apply with equal or 
greater force to claims constituting clouds or interference with 
real property. See Joannin v. Qgilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N.W. 
217, where the court held that money paid by an owner to obtain 
a release of a disputed mechanics' lien, which was paid to 
enable the owner to clear the title of record so that he could 
consummate a loan to be secured by the property, entitled the 
owner to recover back the money as having been obtained by 
duress. See also, Greenouah v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 531 
P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1975), quoting the rule stated in Joannin v. 
Qgilvie in holding that an appeal was not rendered moot where 
the issue involved a disputed debt secured by real property, and 
the money judgment granting foreclosure was paid during the 
pendency of the appeal. The court found that payment was under 
duress and to avoid the evil of unmerchantable title and did not 
render the appeal moot. 
In this case there was a controlling and immediate 
necessity on the part of the Comptons to complete the sale of 
the home so that the innocent purchasers who were then in 
possession of the home would not be damaged, and so that the 
arrangement for the discounted payoff with a secured lender 
would not be lost frustrating the sale. Under such 
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circumstances and after trying unsuccessfully to reach a 
settlement with Plaintiff or an agreement to escrow the money, 
the Comptons broke off further communications with Plaintiff, 
recorded the Homestead Declaration, and directed the title 
company to pay over the proceeds. There was no other affordable 
and immediate legal remedy available and no other avenue of 
escape from the threatened injury of Plaintiff's Notice of Lien. 
Under these factual circumstances, it falls with greater 
force that an accord and satisfaction was not reached. To 
establish accord and satisfaction, Plaintiff Freed Leasing had 
the burden of proof and would have to do so by demonstrating the 
existence of declarations "of such a clear nature as to assure 
the parties are aware of the extent and scope of such 
agreement." Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 
1276, at p. 1277 (Utah, 1980). 
Comptons clearly had no intent to settle the matter for 
the entire sale proceeds. Plaintiff did not even request or 
expect such a settlement, since it addressed its letter to the 
title company advising it that Plaintiff would release its lien 
and protect the title company against any claims if it paid 
Plaintiff the entirety of the proceeds. Comptons immediately 
followed the turnover of the funds with the filing of an Answer 
±
 1 
Presumably, Plaintiff agreed to protect the title company 
against any claims that might be made by the Comptons, since 
it would be hard to imagine who else they could have meant 
(see letter labeled Exhibit "A", appended to Stipulation 
of Facts contained in Appellants1 Brief). 
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and a Counterclaim in this pending case, seeking to recover back 
the proceeds wrongfully exacted under duress by Freed Leasing. 
Surely under no stretch of the imagination could this constitute 
a voluntary payment or an accord and satisfaction and at least 
in this regard the trial judge was correct in his conclusion of 
the law as applied to these facts. 
POINT THREE. THE HOMESTEAD RIGHT IS CREATED FROM THE 
MOMENT OF TAKING TITLE. THE EXEMPTION MAY BE PERFECTED BY FILING 
EVEN AFTER THE CONVEYANCE BY THE HOMESTEAD CLAIMANT, AND THE 
CONVEYANCE OF THE EXEMPT INTEREST CANNOT BE ATTACKED AS A 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 
Section 78-23-3(5) U.C.A. states that when a homestead 
is conveyed by the owner, the property, after conveyance, is not 
subject to a lien that would be invalid because of the Homestead 
Exemption in the hands of the claimant. This Court, in Sanders 
v. Cassity, (586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978), held that the Declaration 
of Homestead could be filed even after the conveyance of the 
property and when the homestead claimant was no longer in title. 
It is clear, therefore, that property which is 
beyond the reach of the creditor due to a 
homestead exemption in the debtor will still 
be protected once the property is conveyed to 
another. 
The trial court found that the value of the 
conveyed one-half interest in the subject 
property was less than the statutory exemption 
and that appellant produced no evidence of 
record to show the value exceeded the amount 
declared; therefore, the entire interest 
passed to Sanders free and clear of ANY LIEN 
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REPRESENTED by appellant's JUDGMENT. 586 P. 2d 
423, at p. 426 (emphasis added). 
It has also been established that the conveyance of a 
homestead interest, even with the intent to avoid creditors and 
where no consideration is received by the claimant, is 
nonetheless not subject to an attack as a fraudulent conveyance. 
In Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietien. et Ux. 63 Utah 321, 225 P. 
598 (1924), the court stated: 
A homestead cannot be made the subject of attack 
by a creditor upon the ground that it was sold 
or conveyed in fraud of such creditor. In the 
view that creditors may not legally attack a 
homestead, they have no concern in its 
disposition by the claimant . . . The mere fact 
the claimant may have conveyed, or may have 
attempted to convey his homestead, when such 
conveyance is attacked by a creditor . . . does 
not prevent him from successfully claiming the 
premises as a homestead. (225 P. 598, at p. 
600) . 
POINT FOUR. EDWIN COMPTON IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN PURSUING HIS COUNTERCLAIM 
TO RECOVER THE SALE PROCEEDS TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF, 
Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. states that: 
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of 
the individual is entitled to injunctive 
relief, damages, or both, against a creditor 
or other person to prevent or redress a 
violation of this chapter. A court may award 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a 
party entitled to injunctive relief or 
damages. (Emphasis)• 
The cloud upon Edwin Compton's title and the 
unmarketability of such title was brought about by Plaintifffs 
recordation of a Notice of Lien claiming a lien upon the 
interest of Debra Compton in the family home. Debra Compton had 
previously conveyed her interest bv emit ni*i™ ***** *— «J~J 
14 
Compton and, as clearly demonstrated by the statutes and cases 
analyzed hereinbefore, the conveyance was not subject to an 
attack as a fraudulent conveyance and her interest was further 
exempt from judicial lien. Because these principals arise and 
are only cognizable under the homestead exemption statutes, 
Edwin Compton should be entitled, as a spouse of the claimant 
who would have a right to injunctive relief, damages or both, to 
also have an award of reasonable attorney's fees. This right 
arose no later than the time the Comptons filed their 
Councerclaim seeking to recover back the proceeds wrongfully 
taken by Plaintiff and Plaintiff asserted its defense that they 
were not so entitled. As stated under Point One, this Court 
should interpret this statute liberally to promote its remedial 
purpose, and this is an appropriate occasion for doing so. 
Alternatively, Edwin Compton is entitled to an award of 
attorneyfs fees under Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. As previously 
briefed, at the time that Plaintiff asserted its defense to 
Edwin Compton's Counterclaim, the defense was surely without 
merit since Ed Compton was entitled to the return of all the 
proceeds. Plaintiff's conduct preceeding and necessitating the 
Counterclaim and its assertion of the defense and resistance to 
returning the money, was in bad faith under the standards set 
forth in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, Comptons also asserted a slander of title 
claim which they still believe was well taken because of 
Plaintiff's recording of a Notice of Lien. However, the damages 
that Edwin Compton sustained is loss of the money taken, 
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interest thereon, and the expenses (including attorney's fees) 
necessitated by the action. The only additional element of 
relief that would be available under slander of title would be 
punitive damages. Quite frankly, the Comptons had hoped and 
expected that this matter would be resolved quickly and 
expeditiously by a motion for summary judgment that was made 
before the trial court. They guessed wrong, but they believed 
the recovery of fees was more clearly available under Section 
78-27-56 U.C.A. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 1989. 
I hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is 
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